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Abstract: We study competition among a score of firms participating in an online market for
a commodity-type memory module. Firms were able to adjust prices continuously; prices de-
termined how the firms were ranked and listed (lowest price listed first), with better ranks
contributing to firms' sales. Using a year's worth of hourly data, we document the pricing dy-
namics, cycles, and other patterns in this market. We then characterize empirically the factors
which drive price changes, noting clear evidence of firm heterogeneity in the choice of pricing
strategy. Finally, we develop a framework for simulating counterfactual market settings, using
the simulations to examine counterfactuals involving different mixes of firms according to pricing
strategies.
JEL Codes: L11, C73, D21, L81
Contact Information: Ellison: Department of Economics, M.I.T., 50 Memorial Drive, Cam-
bridge, MA 02142; tel. (617) 253-3821; fax. (617) 253-1330; email sellison@mit.edu. Snyder:
Department of Economics, Dartmouth College, 301 Rockefeller Hall, Hanover, NH 03755; tel.
(603) 646-0642, fax. (603) 646-2122, email chris.snyder@dartmouth.edu.
Acknowledgments: The authors are grateful to Hongkai Zhang for superb research assistance, to
Glenn Ellison for a number of useful conversations, and to Florian Englmaier, Georg Gebhardt,
Chakravarthi Narasimhan, Mo Xiao, and various seminar participants for useful comments.
1. Introduction
There is a vast and rich theoretical literature on the dynamics of repeated games. One conclusion
of this literature is that many different market outcomes are possible. Full collusion, collusion
on a focal price, cyclical markup patterns, and prices exactly tracking costs, are among the
possibilities. This lack of a clear theoretical prediction suggests an important role for empirical
analysis. We are interested in the market outcomes in one particular empirical setting, an online
market with a large number of firms, ranked by price, with highly visible and easy-to-change
prices. We want to understand the effect that this transparency and immediacy has on the firms'
abilities to maintain markups, and, more generally, the factors that affect firms' decisions to
change prices. We also want to determine whether the particulars of our empirical setting can
give rise to cyclical patterns, and, if so, of what variety.
The empirical literature on repeated games has often been hampered by the paucity of com-
plete, high-frequency pricing data over long periods of time. Notable exceptions include work on
the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel by Porter (1983) and Ellison (1994), the Sugar In-
stitute sugar cartel by Genesove and Mullin (2001), and British shipping cartels by Scott Morton
(1997); research on Edgeworth cycles in retail gasoline pricing (Eckert and West 2004 and Noel
2007b among others), and more recent work on Edgeworth cycles in online advertising auctions
by Edelman and Ostrovsky (2010) and Zhang (2010).1 It is interesting to note that laws against
collusion and other types of price fixing may have significantly hampered the study of pricing
dynamics by academics because they have made the gathering of detailed pricing data by rivals
a de facto suspicious activity. Regulated industries or industries in the process of deregulation,
such as the wholesale electricity market, often gather detailed pricing data, but these data may
be less useful for the study of unfettered competition. Finally, there are many markets that might
1The data on the Joint Executive Committee, the Sugar Institute, and the British shipping cartels were gathered
by the market participants in a pre-Sherman Act period where, because collusion was legal, gathering detailed
pricing data on rivals would not have been viewed as suspicious. The retail gasoline pricing data used by Noel were
painstakingly gathered by hand twice every day on a commute to and from work. The data on online advertising
auctions were gathered by Yahoo! and Google, who were actually running the auctions.
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be ill-suited to the empirical study of repeated pricing games simply because of their institutional
structure. Markets where prices are hard to change or hard to observe may yield less interesting
pricing dynamics, for instance.
Web-scraping technologies, of course, have started to enhance the availability of pricing data.
They have made detailed pricing data fairly easy to collect, and researchers have started to exploit
them. Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004) is an excellent example of a study which used detailed
pricing data collected on the web over a period of time, although their focus was not on the firms'
repeated game strategies. We, too, have gathered most of our data by scraping firm and pricing
data from a price search website for computer components. Furthermore, institutionally, we have
a setting amenable to the empirical study of repeated games. In particular, we have identified
47 firms fairly active in selling a particular commodity-type memory module over the internet
during one particular year. They list their prices for the item on a price search website and can
change their listed prices at will. Prices are observable by all market participants. Wholesale
costs are volatile, so firms must change their prices sometimes or they will either be selling at
large losses or get bumped off the list of the twenty-four lowest prices. Consumers focus mostly
on price-based rank of the firms when making their purchase decisions,2 so firms are acutely
aware of their rivals' prices. The transparency and immediacy of this empirical setting, along
with the relative homogeneity of the products offered, have the potential to result in interesting
pricing dynamics.
Our goal with this paper is three-fold. First, we want to document the pricing dynamics,
cycles, and other patterns in this market. Second, we want to characterize empirically the factors
which drive price changes, noting clear evidence of firm heterogeneity. Finally, we develop a
framework for simulating counterfactual market settings. We will use the simulations to examine
counterfactuals arising from different mixes of the types of firms participating in the market, but
this framework is sufficiently flexible to allow for a large variety of types of counterfactuals.
2See Ellison and Ellison (2009a) for demand estimates in this market.
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One of the striking aspects of this market that we note is firm heterogeneity. Standard eco-
nomic reasoning would suggest that our setting would engender homogeneity, not the heterogeneity
we observe. For instance, the specific product on which we focus is fairly undifferentiated. We
exploit the fact that the price search engine that mediates this market has predefined product
categories, and we focus on one high-volume category, 128MB PC100 memory modules. The
firms with the twenty-four lowest prices in this category are all selling generic, untested modules
with unfavorable warranty and return terms. Furthermore, brand names of firms are relatively
unimportant. Most consumers would have never encountered the names of any of these firms
before. From talking to one of the business owners in the market, we gather that the competing
firms are all small, share wholesale sources, and have similar sets of products. Yet we observe
significant heterogeneity in the repeated game strategies that they seem to employ. We find this
heterogeneity interesting enough to document, but we must remain largely agnostic about its
origin. Even though the firms share wholesale sources, they might have different cost structures
internally and may, therefore, face different marginal costs of fulfilling orders. They could enjoy
different levels of managerial competence, which could account for the different strategies we
observe. Finally, even if the firms were identical in all of these respects, it is possible that
the heterogeneity we observe is simply the result of experimentation with different strategies or
mixing. In fact, the business owner to whom we spoke acknowledged experimenting constantly
with different website designs in addition to pricing strategies.3
Our paper proceeds in eight sections. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3
offers additional details about the empirical setting. Section 4 describes the data set we use.
Section 5 discusses how we classify firms into different \strategic clusters" to account for the
heterogeneity we observe. Section 6 presents and interprets our empirical model of firm pricing.
Section 7 presents our simulations of counterfactuals of the mix of different strategic clusters.
We conclude in Section 8.
3In fact, he opened multiple websites selling identical products to facilitate this experimentation.
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2. Literature Review
The first part of this section provides a review of relevant theoretical papers in order to provide
some background for our empirical work. The second part surveys the related empirical literature,
highlighting our paper's contribution.
2.1. Theoretical Literature
The theoretical literature provides a mixed view on the ability of firms to sustain high margins
in our market. The repeated-game literature (see e.g., Fudenberg and Maskin 1986) suggests
that the monopoly outcome is sustainable if firms have a discount factor close enough to 1. In
our market, firms could adjust price instantaneously, and these price changes are immediately
registered to rivals along with customers, allowing rivals to respond to price cuts with their
own. Translated back into a discrete-time setting, the period lengths in our market effectively are
arbitrarily short and the discount factor arbitrarily close to 1, suggesting according to the Folk
Theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) that full collusion is a possibility. Other factors that
textbooks point to as facilitating collusion are also present in our market, including a homogeneous
product and firms without glaring asymmetries among them (see Tirole 1988, Section 6.1, for a
discussion).
On the other hand, other considerations may suggest that collusion is difficult, providing
a rationale for the more competitive prices that we will end up observing. First, Fudenberg
and Maskin's (1986) Folk Theorem indicates that collusion on the monopoly outcome may be
a possibility but not a necessity, with a whole range of other outcomes possible, including
marginal-cost pricing. How firms arrive at their repeated-game strategies and the market arrives
at an equilibrium in the presence of this multiplicity of equilibria has been the subject of active
research inspired by Axelrod's (1984) seminal work. A second factor hindering collusion is
the relatively large number of firms in our market: hundreds of firms were listed on the price-
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comparison website (our data covers a smaller group of the 24 lowest-price firms each hour, for
a total of 47 with significant presence during the sample period). For many reasons, collusion is
harder to sustain with more firms.4 Third, although in principle firms were able to adjust price
instantaneously, in practice prices were not continuously changed, with lags of days or even weeks
between price changes. Why firms showed inertia in price changes is in part the subject of our
analysis. Davis and Hamilton (2004) offer four suggestions: menu costs, information-processing
lags, customer acceptance, and strategic recognition of rival responses. To this list we would
add a fifth: costs of continually monitoring market conditions, and computing best responses to
these, leading to periods of inattention.
Interesting price patterns can emerge with staggered price setting in repeated games. The
seminal paper in this area, Maskin and Tirole (1988), showed that if two firms set prices in
alternating periods, there exist Markov-perfect equilibria exhibiting a focal price and also others
exhibiting cycling prices (called Edgeworth cycles after Edgeworth 1925). Although we will not
see marked Edgeworth cycles in our price series, firms' rankings in the price list will exhibit
cycles for some firms reminiscent of Edgeworth cycles, and one of the goals of the analysis will
be to characterize these rank cycles. Recent theoretical research has pointed to the robustness
of the cycling equilibria. Wallner (1999) shows that Markov-perfect equilibria with price cycles
can emerge even if the repeated game has a finite horizon. Eckert (2003) shows that while
equilibria with cycling prices exist for a large range of firm sizes, focal-price equilibria require
the two firms to be close enough in size. Work showing that asynchronous pricing will emerge
in equilibrium includes Fishman (1992), Cahuc and Kempf (1999), and Lau (2001). Bhaskar
and Vega-Redondo (2002) justify the restriction to Markov strategies, showing that all Nash
equilibria must be in Markov strategies if agents have limited memory and strategies conditional
on lengthening histories involve complexity costs. This paper is also related to the theme of
4Tirole (1988) provides a general discussion. Chowdhury (2008) shows that the unique equilibrium of a repeated
game with convex costs (related to Edgeworth's capacity constraints) in which firms can choose price and quantity
is a grid point above marginal cost if the number of firms is large enough.
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limits to the reasoning and processing power of the price-setting agents mentioned in the previous
paragraph as possibly leading to pricing inertia.
The price cycles that emerge in the literature cited in the previous paragraph are solely a
function of firm strategy and not driven by fluctuations in market conditions. Of course, price
cycles and other interesting movements may be generated by underlying fluctuations in demand
and/or cost. Indeed these market fluctuations may affect the nature of firms' strategies, typically
providing another factor hindering collusion (Tirole 1988). Classic papers on supergames in
the presence of market fluctuations include Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), analyzing the case
of observable shocks, and Green and Porter (1984), analyzing the case of unobservable shocks.
Several more recent papers have added market fluctuations to repeated games with staggered
pricing (Fishman 1992, Eckert 2004, Leufkens and Peeters 2008).
Much of the theoretical literature tends to focus on symmetric strategies, in contrast to our
findings that firms adopt heterogeneous strategies that fall into identifiable clusters. The theory
does suggest some rationales for heterogeneous strategies. Not knowing the strategies rivals are
playing to say nothing of the best response to these strategies, different firms may be experiment-
ing with different strategies, one or some of which may begin to emerge as dominant through
survivorship or other evolutionary forces, along the lines of Axelrod (1984). In the model of
Hansen et al. (1996), with duopolists in a Bertrand game with differentiated products, an unan-
ticipated negative demand shock may elicit asymmetric responses as a decrease in one firm's
price reduces the benefit to the other from changing its price, and it may decline to do so if price
changes involve a fixed cost. In Lal and Matutes' (1989) model, manufacturers of a product
bundle charge different prices for the individual components although the overall bundle is sold
for the same total amount. This strategy allows firms to compete for different segments of the
heterogeneous population of consumers with their differentiated products. Such strategies may
be relevant for our market, because the product under consideration may be offered to induce
consumers to buy other products along with it or as a substitute for it, so multiproduct strategies
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may be important in our market and may contribute to heterogeneity in strategies.
2.2. Empirical Literature
Our paper investigates the same market and uses the same data as Ellison and Ellison (2009a,
2009b). The focus of our paper is quite different, though. Ellison and Ellison (2009a) estimates
demand in the market, but does not consider dynamic pricing patterns or firm interactions, which
is the focus of the current study. Instead, we will use the demand estimates from that paper as
an input into our analysis. Ellison and Ellison (2009b) also estimates aspects of demand to see
how sensitive consumers are to sales-tax savings from purchasing online and whether consumers
exhibit home-state \biases" in their purchasing.
The two empirical papers most closely related to ours both in substance and empirical setting
are Edelman and Ostrovsky (2010) and Zhang (2010). They both document the occurrence of
Edgeworth cycles in sponsored search, or online advertising, auctions. At first thought, the
empirical settings seem quite different because those papers are studying bids in auctions, not
prices set by firms in a market. On second thought, though, one can actually draw a very close
analogy. In one case, firms are bidding on keywords, where a bid is the amount the advertiser
pays for every click-through. Unlike a standard auction, the second, third, etc., highest bidders
do not lose out in those auctions, though. They simply are allocated less desirable (i.e., less likely
to be clicked) spaces on the results pages. (Typically, the highest bidder is listed first on the
page, the second highest second, and so forth.) Also unlike standard auctions, keyword auctions
occur continuously in real time and advertisers can change their bids at will, just like a seller
can change price in an online market. The analogy to our setting is the following: The price the
firm sets to sell its product is like its bid for a favorable rank on the price search engine page
and that rank determines the number of customers it receives, just like an advertiser's position
on the results page determines click-throughs. We do not, in fact, find Edgeworth cycles in our
price series, unlike Edelman and Ostrovsky (2010) and Zhang (2010), although our objective of
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documenting the pricing patterns that do exist is similar.5
As mentioned in the introduction, our paper is also related to a literature that tries to char-
acterize interesting movements (and perhaps cycles) in retail gasoline prices, including Castanias
and Johnson (1993), Eckert and West (2004), Noel (2007a, 2007b, 2008), Hosken, McMillan,
and Taylor (2008), Atkinson (2009), Wang (2009), Lewis (2009), and Doyle, Muehlegger, Sam-
phantharak (2010). Our hourly data is collected at a higher frequency than most of these studies,
which mostly use daily data, an exception being Atkinson (2009), which uses bi-hourly obser-
vations. Also related is the literature on wholesale gas pricing. Borenstein, Cameron, Gilbert
(1997) identify an asymmetry in price responses to cost rises versus falls.6 Davis and Hamilton
(2004) provide structural estimates of a menu-cost model. They find an adequate fit of the data,
but some specific parameter values have implausible sizes, which they use as evidence in favor
of alternative models of price inertia. Their preferred alternative is that firms keep prices con-
stant in order to prevent undesirable strategic reactions by customers or rivals. They have a very
specific menu-cost model (that of Dixit 1991), which does not nest the inattention story which
we will consider as another alternative here. Lewis (2009) shows that temporary shocks may
have long-lived strategic effects in the wholesale gas market.
Our finding of price dispersion is related to a much larger literature on this issue. Lach
(2002) characterizes price dispersion for a cross-section of retail items sold in Israeli stores.
Barron, Taylor, and Umbeck (2004), Hosken, McMillan, and Taylor (2008), and Lewis (2008)
document price dispersion in retail gasoline. Perhaps closest to the present paper among these is
Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004) because they document price dispersion in an online price
comparison site, so a setting similar to ours.
5Many advertisers in sponsored search auctions use automated bidding programs, which, combined with the first
price auction format, leads to inherently unstable equilibria, according to Edelman and Ostrovsky. Very similar
incentives would exist in our market, but our sellers do not use automated price-setting programs, which could be
an important reason that we do not find Edgeworth cycles.
6A substantial literature, with many contributions by macroeconomists seeking to understand pricing over the
business cycle, studies this issue of asymmetric price adjustments to market conditions. See Klenow and Malin
(forthcoming) for a survey. In a study of strategies rather than price outcomes, Bhaskar, Machin and Reid (2002)
survey over 70 owner-managed Scottish firms to determine how they respond to rivals.
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More specifically we are interested not just in heterogeneity in price outcomes|price dispersion|
but heterogeneity in strategies used in a dynamic game. Hosken, McMillan, and Taylor (2008)
identify strategy heterogeneity in retail gasoline. Lewis (2008) also documents strategy hetero-
geneity, finding that his stylized facts are hard to reconcile with a single existing theory.
There is a literature, largely methodological at this point, on the structural estimation of
dynamic games. The most prominent papers are Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Bajari,
Benkard, and Levin (2007). We see our paper as a complement to that literature in the following
sense. Those models impose restrictions on firm behavior, that all firms' actions are consistent
with Markov perfect equilibria, for instance, to back out certain structural parameters. We want
to, instead, remain entirely agnostic about what type of equilibrium strategies (if any) firms are
playing and instead focus on the empirical determinants of their actions, resulting markups, and
so forth. Imposing those restrictions on firm behavior is neither necessary nor helpful for our
exercise.
An experimental literature has investigated markets in which participants can adjust price
continuously or nearly so (Millner, Pratt, and Reilly 1990, Davis and Korenok 2009). Another
related experimental paper is Leufkens and Peeters (forthcoming), which studies a laboratory
market in which prices are set dynamically with various commitment periods across treatments.
3. Empirical Setting
We look at the online market for computer components mediated by a price search engine called
Pricewatch. This is an empirical setting examined also in two previous papers, Ellison and Ellison
(2009a, 2009b). We focus on aspects of the market and firm behavior that those papers largely
abstracted away from, although details of the empirical setting discussed there will be important
here as well. One should consult those papers for a more complete description.
During the period in which our data were collected, the Pricewatch universe was characterized
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by a large number of small, undifferentiated e-retailers selling memory upgrades, CPUs, and other
computer parts. These retailers tended to do little or no adversiting, have rudimentary websites,
receive no venture capital, and run efficient, profit-maximizing operations. They also tended to
receive a large fraction of their customers through Pricewatch. Potential customers could use
Pricewatch to locate a product in one of two ways. They could either type a technical product
description, such as \Kingston PC2100 512MB," into a search box, or they could run through
a multilayered menu to select one of a number of predefined product categories, e.g., clicking
on \System Memory" and then on \PC100 128MB SDRAM DIMM." In that case, they would
receive back a list of products sorted from cheapest to most expensive in a format with twelve
listings per page. These pre-defined categories may contain as many as 350 listings from 100
different websites. Figure 1 contains the first page of a typical list, that for PC100 128MB
memory modules from October 12, 2000.
We will be focusing on the dynamic aspects of firm price-setting strategy, and it is worth
noting that the Pricewatch lists exhibit substantial turnover from day to day and even from hour to
hour. On average, five of the twenty-four retailers on the first two pages of the above-mentioned
list will change their prices on a given day. Each price change typically moves several other
retailers up or down one place on the list. Some websites are clearly big players that regularly
occupy a position near the top of the Pricewatch list. From time to time one may observe a firm
sitting in the first position for a week or more, but there is no rigid hierarchy.
Some of this turnover can be attributed to the technology used by Pricewatch and the various
websites at the time. Pricewatch is a database-based system which relies on e-retailers' updating
their own prices in its database. Our impression is that almost all of the retailers were setting prices
in Pricewatch manually in the time period we study. A typical retailer has dozens or hundreds of
products listed in the Pricewatch database, making it impractical to constantly monitor one's place
on each predefined product category and the current wholesale prices for each product. Instead,
a retailer might manually examine its position on the most important Pricewatch categories a few
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times a day and might look at current wholesale prices at most once or twice a day.
Alternatively, a sudden drop or uptick in sales (which a retailer might notice if he is monitoring
incoming sales in real time) could indicate that the retailer has been bumped up or down in rank.
Figure 2, derived from demand estimates from Ellison and Ellison (2009a), indicates how a
retailer's daily sales vary with rank. The bulk of sales go to the two or three lowest-priced
retailers in this market, but positive sales still accrue to many additional retailers on the list.
4. Data
4.1 Sources
Our data come from Ellison and Ellison (2009a, 2009b). Their primary data source was prices
from Pricewatch.com. The authors collected information on the twenty-four lowest price offerings,
or the first two pages, in the category of 128MB PC100 memory modules.7 In addition to price,
the authors downloaded the the name of the firm and specific product to be able to trace firm
pricing strategies for specific products over time.8 Due to the frequent turnover on the price lists,
it was important to collect these data at high frequency, and, in fact, they were collected hourly
from May 2000 to May 2001.
Ellison and Ellison (2009a, 2009b) supplemented their Pricewatch data with proprietary data
from a retailer who operated three websites listed on Pricewatch. This retailer provided them
with data on its sales and wholesale acquisition cost data. The authors took this cost to be
common across retailers justified by the fact that the typical retailer made wholesale purchases
every afternoon based on that day's retail orders, so little or no inventory was held.
A large number of firms made brief appearances on the Pricewatch lists. Since we are
7The data contain several other product categories from Pricewatch. Like Ellison and Ellison (2009a, 2009b), we
focus on this particular product category because it is the most active and highest volume of the categories collected.
8The products in this category are, physically at least, fairly homogeneous. We do treat it as a change in product
offering when a firm changes the name of its product, though.
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interested in the dynamics of firms' pricing patterns, we only retained firms that were present for
at least 1,000 hours at some point during the year (approximately one-eighth of our time period)
and changed price while staying on the list at least once. We also deleted the small number of
firms who had multiple products on the first two pages of Pricewatch simultaneously. We were
left with 43 firms that appear at some point during the year, with at most 24 present at any
particular moment.
4.2 Variables
Based on these data, we created a number of variables to describe factors that might be important
to firms' decisions about timing and magnitude of price changes. The rank of that firm on the
Pricewatch list is an obvious candidate, but so would be factors like markup, length of time
since its last price change, number of times a firm has been \bumped," or had its rank changed
involuntarily, since its last price change, and so forth. Table 1 contains a description of these
variables, and Table 2 lists their summary statistics.
Definitions of a few of the variables could use additional explanation. Placement is simply
the fraction of the distance between the next lower-priced firm and the next higher-priced firm a
particular firm is in price space. In other words, if three consecutive firms were charging $85,
$86, and $88, the value for Placement for the middle firm would be 0.33, or (86−85)/(88−85).
Density is a measure of how crowded together firms are in price space in the immediate region
around a particular firm. It is defined as the difference between the price of the next higher-
priced firm minus the price of the firm three spaces below divided by 4. In other words, if five
consecutive firms were charging $84, $84, $85, $86, and $88, the value for Density for the firm
charging $86 would be 1, or (88− 84)/4. CostTrend and CostVol were computed by regressing
the previous two weeks of costs on a time trend and using the estimated coefficient as a measure
of the trend and the square root of the estimated error variance as a measure of the volatility.
The definitions of the remaining variables are self-explanatory.
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Turning to Table 2, note first that the average price charged by our firms for a PC100 128MB
memory module during this period was about $69 with a very large range, $21 up to $131. Most
of this variation occurs over time, with prices typically above $100 at the beginning of the period
and down in the $20s by the end, mirroring a large decline in the wholesale cost of these modules.
4.3 Markups
We will use markups throughout the paper as a handy indicator of firm strategies and market
outcomes. It is useful at this point to look more closely at this measure. As noted in Table 1, we
compute markups as the difference of listed price and wholesale acquisition cost of the memory
module divided by the listed price, or (P − C)/P . Like the accounting \gross margin," this
measure does not reflect any fixed costs or other costs of order fulfillment and therefore overstates
the per-item profit that the retailer enjoys. Despite that, the summary statistics indicate that the
markups here are extremely low, on average 4% but some as low as {35%. The explanation
for the very low, often negative, markups is an add-on pricing policy employed by the retailers,
which is the main focus of Ellison and Ellison (2009a). Since, to the best of our knowledge, all
of the firms in the market were engaging in these policies during this period, it is still useful to
examine relative markups across retailers and over time, even if the markups themselves suggest
lower profits than these firms were actually making.
In addition to the markups being low, they display a surprising amount of variation, ranging
from {35% to 38%. Figure 3 is a histogram of the hourly markups of retailers throughout the
year. The bulk of the markups are small and positive, and the histogram exhibits skew, with the
positive tail being much thicker than the negative tail. Figure 4, a plot of markups over time for
particular ranks, helps decompose the sources of this substantial variation. One thing is clear:
markups are not constant over time. In particular, retailers are not simply choosing a desired
markup and changing price daily to maintain it as costs change. Instead, this figure suggests that
markups are highly volatile within retailer over time. The primary explanation is the underlying
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volatility of costs combined with periods of inattention on the part of the price-setters. For
instance, retailers might check the price of their 128mb PC100 memory modules every few days
or once a week, during which time volatile costs could have changed their markups substantially.
In fact, looking at the set of days when either a firm's rank or the cost it was facing changed,
price was only changed 31% of the time, suggesting inattention or inertia on the part of firms.
Note also that the quantity-weighted markups are fairly close to the rank 1 markups. This
proximity is simply a result of sales being heavily weighted toward the lowest-priced firms. We
also computed the autocorrelations of markups by firm. The hour-to-hour autocorrelations are
high, ranging from 0.95 for some firms to greater than 0.99 for others. Since costs only change
once a day and most retailers do not change prices most days, these figures are not surprising.
The day-to-day autocorrelations, however, exhibit much more range, with some firms at 0.85 and
others as low as 0.20. This range suggests a heterogeneity in pricing strategies, where some firms
maintain fairly stable markups and others do not.
5. Classifying Firms' Strategies
One of the striking characteristics of our data set was heterogeneity in firm strategies. Any
empirical model of pricing behavior would have to accommodate this heterogeneity. Modeling
pricing on a firm-by-firm basis would, of course, allow for arbitrary firm-level heterogeneity, but
that analysis would sacrifice power, perhaps unnecessarily, and, more importantly, would result
in a non-random sample selection, eliminating almost all of the less active firms due to too few
observations. To balance those two concerns, we decided to categorize firms into classes, or what
we will call \strategic clusters," as a prelude to empirically modeling their pricing behavior. To
do so, we use the technique of cluster analysis.
Cluster analysis is a well-known tool in many other social sciences and sciences but is
relatively unknown in empirical economics.9 Therefore, a concise description makes sense here.
9A standard reference for cluster analysis is Romesburg (2004).
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We should begin by saying that we think of cluster analysis more as a handy tool to organize data
as opposed to a statistical technique which produces useful estimates of anything or is optimal
in any sense. With that in mind, we would define cluster analysis as a set of techniques used to
assign objects, which are differentiated on multiple dimensions, to clusters which contain other,
similar objects. In our case, the objects are firms, and we seek to assign them to clusters based
on their strategic actions, such as how often they change their price, where on the price-sorted
lists they want to be, whether they change as a result of being bumped from their rank, and so
forth.10 We think allowing for three clusters of firms is a nice balance between spanning most
of the important firm heterogeneity we want to capture and still obtaining clusters large enough
to analyze empirically with some confidence.
We started by standardizing the variables describing firm strategy to give them all a standard
deviation of one. This step is common prior to performing a cluster analysis to prevent differences
in the variable with the largest variance from dominating the assignment. Then we defined
similarity (or dissimilarity) between two firms as the Euclidean distance in the space defined by
the variables. Finally, we chose a method which defines similarity between clusters as a function
of the sum of squared differences between all firms in the two clusters, Ward's method.
We performed an agglomerative cluster analysis, which first places every firm in its own
cluster and proceeds iteratively by agglomerating the most similar clusters until, in our case,
there are three. We used the standard Stata cluster anaysis command with the options described
above. Table 3 contains the output of the clustering, both in terms of the number of firms which
are assigned to each of three clusters and the average values of key variables within clusters.
These averages provide an intuitive description, or shorthand, for each of the clusters. Cluster 1,
10We used seven variables for the cluster analysis. The averages at the firm level of targeted Rank and targeted
Placement were used, in other words the Rank and Placement that firms had immediately after a price change,
averaged within each firm. In addition, we used firm-level average of NumBump and of SinceChange and firm-level
variance of SinceChange. Finally, we used a firm's total time present on the list and the amount of time the firm
spent in ranks 1{12 as a fraction of its time present on the list. Our goal was to cluster on a group of variables
over which the firm should have a fair amount of control as opposed to variables that describe outcomes that they
experience.
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for instance, could be characterized as the cluster of active firms who like to populate the highest
spots (lowest ranks) on the price-sorted lists. These firms change prices often, tend to have low
markups, and tend to not stray far from their preferred locations on the price-sorted lists. Cluster
2, the smallest cluster, is made up of firms with moderate prices and markups who are relatively
inactive. In other words, these firms may target middle ranks but tend to get bumped far from
their preferred spots before they bother to change their prices. Cluster 3 is higher-priced but
more active than cluster 2. They prefer lower spots (higher ranks) on the price-sorted list and
will change prices relatively often to maintain their preferred locations. To summarize, cluster 1
is low-priced and active, cluster 2 is mid-priced and inactive, and cluster 3 is high-priced and
fairly active.
This characterization is nicely illustrated in Figure 5. We chose one representative firm from
each cluster and graphed both their prices and ranks for the month of August, 2000. Note that
that month, like most of our months, is marked by falling wholesale prices, so a firm listing a
particular price would tend to get bumped higher in rank as firms around it were lowering their
prices in response to falling costs. Just as the means by cluster suggest, our representative firm
from cluster 2 is between the lower price of the cluster 1 firm and the higher price of the cluster
3 firm. In addition, it is noticeably less active than either of its counterparts, changing price only
twice during the month. As a result of its inaction, it is bumped up from a rank of 6 at the
beginning of the month11 to 14 by the end. Both the cluster 1 and cluster 3 firms are close to
their initial rank at the end of the month. There is a notable difference between the firms from
clusters 1 and 3 other than price level, though. The firm in cluster 3 is displaced further from
its initial rank over the course of the month than the firm in cluster 1. It does, though, tend to
regain its initial rank when it is bumped too far, unlike the firm from cluster 2.
An observant reader might notice phenomena in Figure 5 that resemble Edgeworth cycles,
or in fact, upside-down Edgeworth cycles. Recall an Edgeworth cycle involves firms gradually
11It only enters on August 5 and is not present during the first four days of the month. Likewise, the representative
cluster 3 firm enters about halfway through the month, August 14.
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decreasing prices to slightly undercut rivals and then reverting back to a high (monopoly) price
after marginal cost has been reached. Although our cycles might bear some resemblance to
Edgeworth cycles, their origin is entirely different. First, they are cycles in rank, not price, and
rank is not something that firms can directly control. Second, our cycles result from inactivity,
not the series of small price changes that give rise to Edgeworth cycles. Firms get bumped away
from their desired rank|if cost is falling, they would typically be bumped to higher ranks|until
they are sufficiently far to warrant the effort to change price and regain a desirable rank.
6. Modeling Firms' Price Changes
We use a two-stage model of firms' price-setting behavior. Each period t, corresponding to an
hour in the dataset, the first stage involves each firm deciding whether to keep the same price
from period t − 1 or to change it. Over stretches of time, either because market conditions or
rival actions have remained stable, or because the firm does not wish to exert effort of attending
to current conditions just yet, the firm will decide not to change price. If it decides to change
price in a certain period t, however, it moves to a second-stage decision about the size of the
price change, including the direction of change (increase or decrease). We estimate the first-stage
decision|timing of price change|using a probit specification, in which the dependent variable is
an indicator equalling 1 if firm i changes its price between period t−1 and t and 0 if firm i keeps
price the same. The results are reported in Table 4. We estimate the second-stage decision|size
of price change|using an ordinary least squares regression in which the dependent variable is
the proportional change in price: lnPricei,t − lnPricei,t−1. The results are reported in Table 5.
We estimate three separate models for each of the three strategic clusters of firms, thus allow-
ing us to characterize the heterogeneous strategies across clusters and to reflect this heterogeneity
in the simulations. In addition to these cluster-specific models, we present an initial model that
combines all the firms in one model, as a sort of general summary of the \average" firm strategy.
17
We present two specifications of each model. One is a parsimonious specification that includes
a small set of the most important variables which we believed to have a first-order effect on
firms' pricing decisions: variables reflecting price, such as Markup, variables capturing char-
acteristics of the current spell since the last move, SinceChange and NumBump, and variables
describing recent cost movements, CostTrend and CostVol. This is the specification that will
be used to generate the simulations below, the parsimony helping to generate stable simulations
which turn out to be difficult with the inclusion of less-important variables. To help provide a
full characterization of firms' strategies from a descriptive perspective, we also estimate a rich
specification that includes additional variables which may potentially affect firms' pricing, albeit
in a less powerful way. The rich specification includes controls for the distribution of prices in
the neighborhood of firm i (Placement and Density) and aspects of distribution of prices more
globally (LowPrice, PriceRange, and AvgMarkup).
6.1. Timing of Price Change
Consider the results for the probit model of the timing of price change reported in Table 4. All
results are presented as marginal effects for ease of interpretation, and all but the results for
the markup variables (Markup and Markup2) are scaled up by 103 for legibility. The combined
probit involves over 165,000 observations, over 60% of which are for firms in strategic cluster 1
(the preponderance of observations due to the fact that half the firms are in cluster 1 and these
firms tend to have more complete presence during the sample period). The combined probits in
the first set of columns will generally be somewhere in the middle of the three clusters' results,
but somewhat skewed toward the cluster 1 results. Reported standard errors are robust to het-
eroskedasticity and are adjusted to account for the possible non-independence across observations
for the same firm.12
12These are sometimes referred to as clustered standard errors, a usage of \cluster" which should be kept distinct
from the strategic clusters used throughout this paper. Clustered standard errors adjust for the correlation among
errors for a single firm, whereas a strategic cluster involves a group of firms identified by the methods of cluster
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It should be noted that relatively few of the results for cluster 2 are statistically significant.
This is true for two reasons. First, one of the central characteristics of the cluster is to adjust
prices relatively infrequently. Hence there will not be much variation in the dependent variable
to explain. Second, although the probits for cluster 2 include more than 20,000 observations,
this is still only a small fraction of the overall sample. This is in fact a small sample once one
recognizes that time-series observations for a single firm are not independent and that there are
few price changes (showing up as 1's for the dependent variable) in the subsample. Overall, the
pseudo-R2 values are fairly low across the probits, only as high as 0.117 (i.e., 11.7%), evincing
the difficulty in predicting the rare event of a price change in hourly data.
We will focus on the parsimonious probits (the first of the two columns for each cluster),
turning to the rich specification at the end of the subsection. The marginal effect of Markup in
the probits is difficult to discern directly because it enters as a quadratic to allow for possible
nonlinear effects. To aid in interpretation, Figure 6 graphs the quadratic function associated with
the marginal effects from the parsimonious specification. The dotted curve for the combined
results, in particular its steep downward slope for negative margins, indicates that the average
firm is very sensitive to large negative margins and likely to adjust their prices then. For example,
a price-cost margin of {0.35, meaning that price is 35% below cost, leads the average firm to
increase its probability of a price change in a given period by almost 0.012, that is, 1.2 percentage
points. This may seem like a small increase in probability until one recalls that this is hourly
data, and the probability of a price change in any given hour is quite low to begin with. The
hourly marginal effect cumulates into a larger effect over longer time periods, implying that a 1.2
percentage point marginal effect is actually quite large. The effects for cluster 1 firms are even
stronger, with a markup of {0.35 leading to a 0.013 increase in the probability of price change
in an hour. Clusters 2 and 3 show some but much less sensitivity, reflecting the more general
result that cluster 1 includes more responsive firms than the other clusters.
analysis.
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The fact that the curve for cluster 3 in Figure 6 passes through the origin and becomes negative
for positive margins indicates that positive margins lead firms in this cluster to be slower to adjust
prices. Evidently, they are willing to trade off increased margins for lower sales in this region.
The curves for clusters 1 and 2 tell a different story. Positive margins less than 30% have little
effect on the firms' likelihood of changing prices, as can be seen from the curves hovering close
to the horizontal axis. For large, positive margins, cluster 1's curve rises steeply and becomes
positive, and cluster 2's curve also becomes positive, indicating that the largest positive margins
also lead these firms to adjust prices, presumably because they are losing demand. For example,
projecting out to a margin of 0.4 (price 40% above cost, which is slightly outside our data range),
this margin would lead a cluster 1 firm to be 0.003 (0.3 percentage points) more likely to change
price in a given hour.
The SinceChange variable is included to determine whether prices are adjusted according to
a systematic schedule. Changing prices according to a systematic schedule, say every x periods,
would show up as a positive coefficient on SinceChange as the firm would be increasingly likely
to change price as the next scheduled date for changing price approached. Instead, we find
a negative and statistically significant result for the combined, cluster 1, and cluster 3 results.
For these clusters, a firm's price changes tend to be bunched in time, followed by longer spells
of inactivity than would be predicted by regular schedule. This finding supports an inattention
model, but of a certain type, with the manager of each of these firms being drawn away from
watching the market at random times for random durations, but then making rapid adjustments
in periods he or she is allowed to attend to the market, as opposed to setting prices and then
returning to revise them at consistent intervals, say once every other day. Cluster 2's results are
essentially 0, indicating that pricing for these firms may conform more to a regular schedule.
The examples in the lower panels of Figure 5 illustrate this pattern, with the representative firm
from cluster 2 showing price changes at regular intervals but those for the other clusters being
more scattershot.
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Since NumBump is the net number of ranks a firm has been bumped, positive or negative,
we included the absolute value as an explanatory variable, reasoning that being bumped a long
distance in either direction from the firm's desired rank could precipitate a price change. In fact,
|NumBump| is significant in all specifications and positive as expected: the further the firm is
bumped in either direction from the rank last chosen, the more likely it is to change your price.
Finally, movements of wholesale costs appear to be an important determinant of when to
change prices, but in different ways for the three clusters. Cluster 1 is moved to change price
either when costs are rising quickly or falling quickly. Cluster 2 only reacts mildly to cost changes
and only then to rising costs. Cluster 3 reacts strongly to cost changes, but only when costs are
falling. Cluster 1 firms, in addition to being most active, seem to also be the most sensitive to
market conditions. Cluster 2 firms are somewhat insulated both from large negative margins and
from being bumped from the lowest 24 and can afford to be less sensitive to the vicissitudes of
the wholesale market. Cluster 3 firms, who tend to have high ranks, may be the most sensitive
to costs falling because, if they do not act, they will soon find themselves out of the lowest 24
prices as firms come in and undercut them. Moving to the next cost variable, cost volatility is
less important in determining time of price change, although there is some evidence that cluster-3
firms are more likely to change price during periods of high cost volatility.
Moving to the rich probit specifications in the second of the columns for each cluster, het-
erogeneity across clusters is apparent in the additional variables in this specification as well.
For instance, Placement has the expected negative sign in cluster 2, indicating that a firm that
is well positioned relative to its neighbors in price space is less likely to want to change its
price. The ideal placement (associated with the highest value of Placement) is one just below
the higher-priced neighbor because this maximizes markup subject to keeping the firm's rank
constant, and rank is an important determinant of demand in this market. This effect is not
significantly present for the other clusters, though. Density is significant and has the expected
positive sign for clusters 1 and 2, where firms are more likely to adjust prices if their price is
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close to a concentration of other firms', but is not important for cluster 3. Coefficients on Night
and Weekend are negative and highly significant in all cases. These findings are supportive of
an inattention story as well, where the cost of a manager's attentiveness increases during nights
and weekends.13
6.2. Size of Price Change
Turn next to the results for the size of price change reported in Table 5. These ordinary least
squares regressions were run on only the subset of observations for which there was a price
change from the previous hour. This results in a much smaller sample because price changed in
fewer than 1% of the observations. The cluster 2 regressions should be interpreted with particular
caution because they only include 70 observations.
The dependent variable is the change in log price, ln(Priceit)− ln(Priceit−1), so effectively
a percentage change for small price changes. As before, the reported standard errors are het-
eroskedasticity robust, adjusted to account for non-independence across observations for the same
firm. Besides the first two variables (constant and Markup), the coefficients for the remaining
variables are scaled by 102 for legibility. The results are generally sensible and consistent with
prior expectations. Notice that the R2 in Table 5 is an order of magnitude higher than the pseudo
R2 from Table 4, implying that it is much easier to predict the size of price change than its exact
timing at an hourly frequency.
We will focus on the more robust, substantial, and significant results, starting with the constant
term. Comparing the constant term across clusters 1 and 3, we see that cluster 1 firms on average
have larger reductions in price when they change it compared to cluster 3 firms, but cluster 2 has
the largest. This is consistent with cluster 1 maintaining low prices and cluster 2 having to make
large moves because they are infrequent. Markup is negative and significant across all columns.
13If demand fell to zero during nights and weekends, it would be impossible to separate an inattention story from
a story where a perfectly attentive manager did not change prices because his actions would have no effect. Demand,
however, does not fall to zero during these periods. See Figure 2 in Ellison and Ellison (2009b).
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This implies that firms adjust prices to re-establish their ideal margins, increasing price when
margins are negative and decreasing them when margins become too large.
We created two new variables based on SinceChange, which are SinceChange interacted
with dummies for whether cost had been rising or falling. We consider these variables because,
although we would expect firms to make large price changes after long periods of inactivity, those
changes could be large and positive or large and negative. In other words, we might imagine that
SinceChange on its own would be more likely to increase error variance than to predict whether
a price change would be positive or negative. The interactions allow SinceChange to have
differential effects depending on whether costs, and therefore prices, are trending up or down.
Despite our reasoning, though, the SinceChange variables seem to be generally unimportant.
NumBump, now entering as-is instead of as its absolute value, is negative and highly significant in
all specifications|the net number of spaces the firm has been bumped is an important determinant
of how far it moves conditional on moving. Magnitudes are also fairly similar across clusters.
Unlike in the previous regressions, we do not have a priori reasons to separate out potential
effects of positive and negative cost trends since we expect monotonicity|when CostTrend is
positive, we expect most price changes will be positive and when it is negative, we expect most
price changes will be negative. Unlike the results in the previous table, CostTrend does not appear
important here. CostVol, with the exception of the combined results, is also not significant.
Stepping back from the individual coefficients, heterogeneity across clusters is less apparent|
at least from a visual scan|in Table 5 than it was in Table 4. While the variables often had
different signs and significance levels across clusters in Table 4, they differ mainly in magnitude
in Table 5, and in some cases only slightly. While different factors appear to prompt different
types of firm to act (the timing decision in Table 4), conditional on deciding to act, similar
factors drive the firms' actions (the size decision in Table 5. Despite the reduced prominence
of heterogeneity in Table 5, an F test that the parameters estimates across the three groups were
equal rejects that hypothesis resoundingly, with a test of statistic of 6.97 compared with a 1%
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critical value of 3.75.
7. Simulations
In the early 1980s, the political scientist Robert Axelrod carried out a series of simulations
which changed the way that social scientists thought about repeated games (Axelrod, 1984).
Axelrod invited game theory colleagues to submit strategies for a simple two-person repeated
game. He then pitted the strategies against one another in a tournament of simulations to see
which strategies did best at maintaining prices closest to the monopoly price against themselves,
different strategies, the entire field of strategies, and so forth. A simple strategy called \tit-for-
tat," where firms punish their rivals' one-period deviations from the monopoly price by their
own one-period deviations, performed the best (resulted in the highest markups) against a wide
range of other strategies. The simulations we perform here are in this spirit: we can modify
strategies that firms in this market actually use and pit those modified strategies against one
another to simulate the market outcomes under these modifications. For instance, how would
market outcomes change if, say, everyone was using cluster 1 strategies?
Since Axelrod's game was entirely an invention, he was able to control all aspects of it. In
particular, he specified cost functions and profit functions for firms, assuring homogeneity in
those dimensions. Since our simulations are based on actual firms operating in an actual market,
we have no such control, but we can also structure our simulations based on quantities we can
observe and estimate in our market, which Axelrod could not do. We create a set of twenty-
four simulated firms and assign them starting markups by drawing randomly from the empirical
markup distribution we observe. From those markups, we then can back out prices (given cost)
and generate ranks. We then allow cost to move as it actually did and the simulated firms' prices
to evolve as governed by the empirical models we developed and discussed in the previous section.
We can alter the mix of firms competing at will, by simply having different proportions of them
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governed by the three cluster-level empirical models. For instance, to simulate the dynamics of
price competition with a group of firms entirely composed of active, low-price firms, we just have
all of our simulated firms' hour-by-hour decisions arising from cluster 1 empirical estimates.
Note that to ensure well-behaved simulations, we use the more parsimonious specifications for
both the probability-of-change and size-of-change models. In particular, we allow the variables
Markup, SinceChange, and NumBump, as well as firms' sensitivity of cost movements, to drive
the firms' decisions on timing and size of price change in the simulations. Also, we allow for
entry of new firms in the simulations. Firms enter at random times and random ranks on the list
consistent with the frequency and location of firm entry in the actual market.14 Note that firm
entry has the effect of knocking the highest-priced firm off the list so that we always maintain
twenty-four firms.
We performed four different simulations. Our first was simply a simulation where we repro-
duced the actual mix of the three strategic clusters we observe.15 The second simulation imposed
the counterfactual that all firms are of cluster 1. The third simulation imposed the counterfactual
that all firms are of cluster 2. Finally, the fourth simulation imposed the counterfactual that all
firms are of cluster 3.
Table 6 contains the results from our simulations.16 Note first that our simulations maintaining
the actual mix produce similar but slightly smaller markups than the actual markups. For all
firms, markups averaged over 3%; our simulation produced markups of 2%. Also, the ordering
14For class 1, firms entered with probability 8/720 each hour, which resulted in eight expected entrants per month.
They entered uniformly over rank. For class 2, firms entered with the probability 12/720 each hour and were twice
as likely to enter ranks 15-24 as ranks 1{14. For class 3, firms entered with probability 16/720 each hour and were
twice as likely to enter ranks 15{20 and three times as likely to enter ranks 21{24 as ranks 1{14. These figures
were chosen to approximate actual entry rates and locations of firms of different classes.
15The mix of firm types varies over the year, of course, so we used a mix based on the fraction of our 43 firms
that are assigned to each of the three strategic clusters. For 24 firms, that mix turns out to be twelve in cluster 1,
five in cluster 2, and seven in cluster 3.
16For each of the four scenarios we explored through simulations, we performed five simulated years. The range in
average markups across the five years was quite small in each case, {0.0179 to {0.0114 for the cluster 1 simulations,
for instance. We report here the average markups averaged across the five simulated years. Simulating a large
number of years in each case would have been impossible given our current computing constraints, but even if it
had been possible, we are quite confident that the results would be largely unchanged.
25
of markups by class was maintained, with class 1 having the lowest markup and class 3 the
highest.
The last three columns in the table are the average markups from our counterfactual simula-
tions. It is interesting to note how the average markups change when only one type of firm is
present. For cluster 1, the markups edge down slightly, from {0.4% to {1.4%. Strikingly, the
cluster-2 markups change quite substantially, going from 4% to almost 20% when only firms of
that type are present. Finally, the cluster-3 markups also actually edge down slightly but stay
close to 4%. Recall that we characterized cluster 2 firms as mid-priced but least active, so it is
perhaps not surprising that the counterfactual with all firms of that less-active type would result
in substantially higher markups than cluster-2 firms had in the actual-mix simulation. Note,
though, that cluster 2 was the smallest cluster, so the counterfactual involving all firms being in
that cluster is, in some sense, furthest from the mix we observe. Cluster 3, the moderately active
and highest-priced firms have, not surprisingly, the highest average markups in the actual-mix
simulation, and are able to maintain those in the cluster-3-only simulation.
In addition to the summary statistics on simulated markups, we might also be interested
in the distribution and dynamics of these markups. In Figure 7, we graph the markups over
time for the median firm from each of our four simulations and include actual median markups
for comparison. First consider the upper left panel, where actual markups are compared with
simulated markups using the actual mix of firms. We saw in Table 6 that the average simulated
and average actual markups were quite close, but we can now also see the similarity in their
patterns and distributions. There are several periods where patterns of simulated markups closely
mimic actual ones, albeit sometimes with lags or shifts up or down. This graph is striking because
there is no mechanism in the simulations which imposes these patterns. The dynamics are simply
generated by firms making decisions every period governed by their cluster's empirical model.
The counterfactual simulations in the other three panels exhibit more divergence from the
actual markups, as we would expect. The most striking result is the bottom left panel with the
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all-cluster-2 counterfactual. Part way through the year, the firms' simulated markups deviate
upwards and then diverge substantially from the actual markups, seeming to settle around 60%.
(Averaged over the year, these markups are close to 20%.) Recall that cluster-2 firms' probability
of changing price was estimated to be roughly linear in markup while the other clusters had U-
shaped relationships. This lack of a disciplining effect on extreme markups could give rise to this
increase in markups we see as cost goes down. It is important to note, though, that cluster-2 firms
did not wander off into large markups in our actual mix simulation. Their lack of sensitivity to
large markups did not offer enough discipline to keep them in line when only they were present,
but the presence of cluster-1 and 3 firms did. One purpose of our simulations was to provide
an environment to run counterfactual experiments about, say, the mix of firms. Our cluster-2
simulations, then, provide striking evidence that this market would function much differently with
certain different mixes of firm types.
Finally, in Figure 8, we produce a simulated counterpart to our Figure 5, the graph showing
rank and price movements for three representative firms. The simulated firms appear to be
somewhat more active and engage in larger price changes compared to the very modest changes
we see in Figure 5. The cycles in rank, especially for the cluster-2 firm, are still evident, though.
We view this set of simulations as only a first attempt at using our methodology to examine
how the dynamics of firm interactions can change when various aspects of the setting, such as
the mix of firm types, changes. There are a variety of other simulation exercises that we can
perform using this framework. For instance, we could hold fixed firm strategies and vary market
conditions, such as degree of cost volatility or the lags with which firms can observe rivals
prices; or we could hold firm strategies mostly fixed but just change one aspect, say, the degree
of sensitivity to one's rank.
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8. Conclusion
The empirical setting and particular data we have gathered lend themselves to the study of
repeated-game strategies. The observed patterns in prices, price ranks, and markups have not
been well documented to date, and part of our objective is their careful description. We hope
that this careful description will inform future theory work on repeated games as well as lead to
more structural empirical estimation of the phenomena we observe.
In addition to simply documenting these patterns, we develop empirical models of firms'
price-changing behavior, which provide a parsimonious description of the factors which trigger
price changes and the size of the changes when triggered.
Finally, we construct a framework for simulating market outcomes when aspects of the empir-
ical setting are altered. This simulation framework not only disciplines our empirical analysis|
had we fed into our simulations an analysis that did not identify the most important factors in
firm price changes, we could not have simulated markups so similar to the actual ones|but it
also provides a valuable tool for counterfactual analysis. The set of simulations we performed
suggested that the mix of firm types could have large effects on market outcomes. We view this
framework as quite flexible, allowing many types of simulations beyond the preliminary ones we
present here.
Two findings emerging from the analysis are striking in that they are each consistently found
across several empirical approaches; they are also striking because they do not feature prominently
in standard oligopoly theory. The first result is heterogeneity in strategies across firms. This
heterogeneity was apparent just from a scan of price and rank patterns across firms. It was
also apparent from a comparison of coefficients across firm clusters in Table 4 and from formal
F -tests of differences across clusters for Tabels 4 and 5. The firms and certainly the product
sold appear to have been fairly homogeneous in this commodity memory market; given this
homogeneity, standard oligopoly theory does not give strong reasons for differences in pricing
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strategies. The simulations drove home the economic importance of the heterogeneity. A market
with just cluster-2 firms eventually showed an exploding price pattern, which was not observed
when the same type of firm was exposed to the discipline of competition when mixed with other
clusters.
The second finding was inertia in pricing behavior. Though firms had the ability to change
prices continuously by changing posts to a database, they ended up with periods of inactivity
stretching over days or weeks in some cases. This inactivity was documented several ways.
Graphs of example price series (Figure 5) showed flat periods, contrasting the volatile movements
in markups driven by cost fluctuations. A more formal measure of pricing inertia, we found that
in only about a third of the days in which a firm faced a change in rank or cost did it end
up changing its price. Various explanations including Edgeworth cycles are inconsistent with
some institutional facts or patterns in the data. The most plausible remaining explanation is that
the inertia was driven by managerial inattention. This explanation is consistent with the low
probability of price changes on nights and weekends found in Table 4.
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Table 1: Definition of Variables
Indexes
Variable varies over Definition
Price i, t Current listed price in dollars
Markup i, t Proportional markup of price over wholesale cost, (P −C)/P
Rank i, t Rank of listing in price-sorted order
SinceChange i, t Hours since firm last changed its price
NumBump i, t Net number of ranks bumped since last price change
Placement i, t Placement between adjacent firms in price space
Density i, t Measure of density in price space of firms with nearby ranks
FirstPage i, t Indicates appearance on first page (rank 1{12)
PriceLow t Lowest of currently posted prices
PriceRange t Range across currently posted prices
AvgMarkup t Average across firms' price margins in levels
NewFirm t Indicates new entry into ranks 1{24 in past two weeks
Night t Indicates hour from midnight to 8 a.m. EST
Weekend t Indicates Saturday or Sunday
CostTrend t Wholesale cost trend over previous two weeks
CostVol t Wholesale cost volatility over previous two weeks
Notes: i indexes firms and t indexes hours.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Price 68.94 34.71 21 131 165, 955
Markup 0.03 0.10 −0.35 0.38 165, 955
Rank 11.65 6.73 1 24 165, 955
SinceChange 111.97 135.41 1 1, 113 165, 955
NumBump 1.38 3.62 −23 21 165, 955
Placement 0.60 0.42 0 1 165, 955
Density 0.56 0.39 0 3 165, 955
FirstPage 0.54 0.50 0 1 165, 955
PriceLow 62.63 32.90 21 122 8, 218
PriceRange 12.62 4.36 5 29 8, 218
AvgMarkup 0.04 0.07 −0.12 0.28 8, 218
NewFirm 0.63 0.48 0 1 8, 218
Night 0.33 0.47 0 1 8, 218
Weekend 0.29 0.45 0 1 8, 218
CostTrend −0.18 0.70 −2.06 1.53 8, 185
CostVol 1.62 1.06 0.00 4.36 8, 185
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Table 3: Selected Descriptive Statistics by Strategic Cluster
Cluster 1 (22 firms) Cluster 2 (8 firms) Cluster 3 (13 firms)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Markup 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.09
Rank 9.22 5.91 13.16 6.32 17.82 4.61
SinceChange 96.23 121.67 210.82 194.70 103.76 108.91
NumBump 1.14 3.21 2.06 4.83 1.68 3.89
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Table 4: Probit Model of Timing of Price Change
Variables Firms combined Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Markup −0.020∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.007 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.013) (0.009)
Markup2 0.041∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.023 −0.006 −0.017 0.023 0.044
(0.013) (0.009) (0.021) (0.015) (0.028) (0.018) (0.048) (0.027)
SinceChange −0.026∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ 0.002 0.001 −0.016∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.004)
|NumBump| 0.618∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.107) (0.211) (0.184) (0.048) (0.044) (0.143) (0.115)
CostTrend 1.874∗∗ 3.324∗∗∗ 2.915∗∗∗ 3.438∗∗∗ 1.785∗ 0.989∗ −1.657 −0.793
(when positive) (0.873) (0.734) (0.938) (0.927) (0.851) (0.711) (3.317) (1.768)
CostTrend −3.337∗∗∗ −1.200∗∗ −3.013∗∗ −0.948 −0.778 −1.025 −3.583∗∗∗ 0.045
(when negative) (0.861) (0.485) (1.360) (0.748) (1.061) (0.751) (0.942) (0.538)
CostVol 0.258 0.306∗ 0.368 0.457 −0.511 −0.191 1.135∗∗ 0.538∗∗
(0.216) (0.177) (0.306) (0.263) (0.418) (0.217) (0.389) (0.224)
Placement 0.092 −0.117 −1.053∗∗∗ 1.020
(0.614) (0.764) (0.484) (0.893)
Density 1.369∗∗ 2.039∗∗∗ 1.439∗∗∗ −0.772
(0.576) (0.777) (0.401) (0.902)
PriceLow −0.029∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ 0.002 0.005
(0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012)
PriceRange 0.244∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ −0.088 0.292∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.093) (0.077) (0.077)
AvgMarkup 0.015∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.004 −0.013∗∗
(0.00) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
NewFirm −1.441∗∗∗ −1.521 −1.881∗∗∗ 0.080
(0.474) (0.661) (0.591) (0.330)
Night −9.774∗∗∗ −11.722∗∗∗ −2.770∗∗∗ −7.541∗∗∗
(0.924) (1.293) (0.416) (1.737)
Weekend −5.921∗∗∗ −7.093∗∗∗ −1.490∗∗∗ −4.268∗∗∗
(0.590) (0.860) (0.324) (0.799)
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.071 0.012 0.064 0.034 0.117 0.011 0.101
Observations 165,330 165,330 107,436 107,436 20,277 20,277 37,617 37,617
Notes: Dependent variable is a 0{1 indicator for price change by firm i at time t. Marginal effects reported. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors accounting for non-independence across
observations for same firm reported in parentheses. Results for all but the markup variables (Markup, Markup2 , and AvgMarkup) scaled up by 103 for display purposes. Statistically significant
in a two-tailed test at the ∗10% level, ∗∗5% level, ∗∗∗1% level.
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Table 5: Ordinary Least Squares Model of Size of Price Change
Variables Firms Combined Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Constant −0.010∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.011∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ 0.008 0.038∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014)
Markup −0.161∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗ −0.290∗∗∗ −0.340∗ −0.496∗∗∗ −0.234∗∗∗ −0.425∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.031) (0.028) (0.044) (0.148) (0.133) (0.038) (0.085)
SinceChange 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005∗ 0.006∗ 0.002 0.002
(rising CostTrend) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
SinceChange −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.002 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.005
(falling CostTrend) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
NumBump −0.504∗∗∗ −0.472∗∗∗ −0.525∗∗∗ −0.470∗∗∗ −0.533∗∗∗ −0.412∗∗ −0.349∗∗∗ −0.310∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.060) (0.081) (0.081) (0.118) (0.130) (0.091) (0.117)
CostTrend 0.182 −0.044 0.186 0.223 0.774 1.962∗∗ −0.090 −0.637
(0.195) (0.198) (0.226) (0.260) (0.976) (0.765) (0.397) (0.368)
CostVol 0.272∗∗ 0.275∗∗ 0.157 0.155 0.743 0.715 0.296 0.371
(0.130) (0.125) (0.153) (0.143) (0.413) (0.616) (0.342) (0.366)
PriceLow 0.005 0.017∗∗ 0.037 0.024∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.022) (0.010)
AvgMarkup 0.073∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗ 0.222∗
(0.041) (0.050) (0.154) (0.114)
NewFirm 1.464∗∗∗ −1.513∗∗∗ −0.612 1.339∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.225) (1.243) (0.363)
R2 0.301 0.319 0.305 0.338 0.624 0.671 0.327 0.385
Observations 1, 593 1,593 1,253 1,253 70 70 270 270
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Priceit)− ln(Priceit−1) for only those observations it with a non-zero price change between t−1 and t. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors accounting
for non-independence across observations for same firm reported in parentheses. Results for all but the constant, Markup, and AvgMarkupscaled up by 102 for display purposes. Statistically
significant in a two-tailed test at the ∗10% level, ∗∗5% level, ∗∗∗1% level.
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Table 6: Actual Versus Simulated Values of Average Markups
Simulated markups in listed scenario
Maintaining Assuming Assuming Assuming
Subgroup Actual actual all firms in all firms in all firms in
of firms markups mix cluster 1 cluster 2 cluster 3
All firms 0.0343 0.0203
Cluster 1 firms 0.0056 −0.0038 −0.0142
Cluster 2 firms 0.0276 0.0441 0.1982
Cluster 3 firms 0.1200 0.0445 0.0370
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Figure 1:  Example of a Pricewatch webpage 
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Figure 2:  Effect of Rank on Demand 
Notes:  Estimates of effect of rank on demand from Ellison and Ellison (2009) using two different specifications.  Solid 
line is from a regression of the natural log of quantity on linear rank.  Dots are coefficients from a more flexible specification 
with rank fixed effects; vertical bars provide 95% confidence interval around fixed effects. 
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Figure 4:  Markups over time 
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Note:  Based on linear and squared markup coefficients from parsimonious models in Table 4 probits. 
Figure 6:  Quadratic marginal effect of markup on probability of price change 
Figure 7:  Simulated Versus Actual Markups for the Median Firm Over Time 
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Note:  Simulation maintains actual mix of clusters. 
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